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I
GENERAL ISSUES
A. Defense Planning and Foreign Policy
In his report to the Swedish Academy of War Sciences1 in 1972, I. Muller
touched upon the issue of guerrilla wars waged by the civilian population: "In
Sweden we reckon with the fact that irregular war will be conducted behind
enemy lines, and it seems very likely that resistance movements will someday
form among us behind enemy lines, inter alia, in support of irregular war.
* . . In view of these facts, Swedish foreign policy is working vigorously to cre-
ate further rules of international law for the protection of the civilian popula-
tion.2
In July, 1977, after the adoption in Geneva of the Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), the Swedish Foreign
Office put out a pamphlet surveying what the Convention had accomplished.
This pamphlet bears out, in part, what Miller had suggested. It relates:
In the conference work the Swedish delegation was certainly one of the most
energetic on many questions and exercised considerable influence on the final
result . . . Swedish delegates were also very active in negotiating the rules for
the protection of civil defense. On certain other central points, other small
states were particularly influential (for example, Norway, concerning the pro-
tection of guerrilla soldiers).3
B. Air Warfare Versus Guerrilla Warfare-Shifting the Scales
Protection of the civilian population under belligerent occupation, which
may have been a central theme in Swedish planning, was only of marginal in-
terest at the Red Cross conferences that eventually produced the Geneva Pro-
tocols. The Geneva Protocols, essentially the result of the confrontation be-
* Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Stockholm.
1. Kungl. Krigsvetenskapsakademin (author's translation). Unless otherwise specified, transla-
tions from original are by author-Ed.
2. Miller, Civilf6rsvaret och sdkerhetspolitiken, 1972 KKVA HANDLINGAR OCH TIDSKRIF-r 165.
3. UD informerar-Krigets lagar-Manskliga rdttigheter i vaipnade konflikter-1977:4, at 5.
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tween two modes of combat that had until then been largely neglected in
international law-air warfare and guerrilla warfare-had a different focus.
Combat aircraft were hardly taken seriously among the draftsmen at The
Hague in 1907 when the basic rules of warfare were hammered out. Even
though a prohibition of discrimination based on "wealth" was introduced into
article 3 of the Red Cross Conventions of 1949, most of the delegates in Ge-
neva in 1949 did not appreciate that guerrilla warfare was the apex of the
Marxist class struggle, nor did the experts on the matter find reason to lec-
ture on it. In the Vietnam war, however, the struggle was, in a most clear-cut
fashion, between one side relying on guerrilla warfare and the other side
relying on air warfare. The work leading to the adoption of the Geneva Pro-
tocols was in many respects an attempt to interfere with the Vietnam war by
shifting the scales in favor of the guerrillas, at the expense of the air combat-
ants.
During this period, the period of the Vietnam war, Sweden was pursuing
a foreign policy that made the country an Albania to America and the West-
ern industrialized nations. This policy led to the withdrawal of the American
Ambassador from Sweden. It was therefore natural that Sweden should par-
ticipate energetically in the Red Cross conferences. Now that the Vietnam war
is over, the Vietnamese borders are shut tight, and the Geneva Protocols are
adopted, it may be an appropriate time to relate the Protocols that resulted
from the conference to the image of Swedish territory under belligerent occu-
pation that was on the minds of some of those originally endorsing this great
diplomatic campaign.
C. A Peculiar Kind of Criminal Law: The Law of War
When dealing with the law of war, one often loses sight of the fact that
this body of law is essentially disciplinary law for the armed forces; this func-
tion entails all the problems of criminal law. For these reasons, it is useful to
look for a moment at the relationship between criminal law and international
law.
Bassiouni has provided a thoughtful analysis of international criminal law,
characterizing it as "a product of the convergence of the international aspects
of municipal criminal law."' Bassiouni maintains that "[s]uch doctrinal diver-
gencies which exist between international law and criminal law gave interna-
tional criminal law a 'split personality' which has plagued its development. '5
This split personality is not a happy one. As B. J. George has written,
"[N]othing other than an awareness of prevalent human misconduct seems to
bind together those who concern themselves professionally with criminal law
4. Bassiouni, An Appraisal of the Growth and Developing Trends of International Criminal Law, 46
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL 405, 406 (1975).
5. Id. at 426.
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and procedure. Each country's code tends to be viewed as a self-contained
body of law bearing no relationship whatever to the law in any other coun-
try."6 On the other hand, Gerhard Mueller has remarked, "A municipal crim-
inal lawyer cannot but with a certain admiration and astonishment look at the
extraordinary enthusiasm of those international lawyers who have been pri-
marily responsible for this new peace-insurance machinery which simply rests
on the creation of a code and an international court."7 To Mueller, this
code-the U.N. Draft Code on Offences Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind-"reveals an almost reckless abandonment of all concern for those
principles which mankind has learned to appreciate as essential for the effec-
tiveness of criminal law."8
Against this background, it is interesting to note that among the driving
forces that led to the formulation of the Protocols at the Red Cross confer-
ences there was, at times, little understanding that extending prisoner of war
status to the guerrillas meant intruding upon those chapters of the penal
codes that deal with crimes of lse-majest6 and the like. 9 One might ask just
how many of those attending the conferences fully understood what was actu-
ally being achieved.
For these reasons, perhaps we should not accept the international law cre-
ated in this field at face value but instead review it critically. Since Swedish in-
terest in the matter turned on the law of belligerent occupation, it seems
appropriate to make this the focus of our interest. Our main concern will be
to see to what extent the present formulations of the international law are rel-
evant to genuine Swedish interests. We will also examine certain factors that
seem to make some of these formulations altogether irrelevant.
D. The Norwegian Model and its Limits
Recent Swedish thinking devoted to belligerent occupation has been based
largely on a Norwegian model. 10 This model may be described as the case of
the "grand attack." The great power attacks from overseas; the Swedish gov-
ernment puts up a fight but ultimately has to find refuge in some allied coun-
6. George, Foreword to 15 WAYNE L. REV. 607 (1969).
7. Mueller, The United Nations Draft Code on Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind:
An American Evaluation, in G. MUELLER & E. WISE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 597, 611
(1965). See also Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 9 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9), U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954).
8. Mueller, supra note 7 at 616.
9. Evidently, the head of the Swedish delegation, Dr. Hans Blix (now Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs), was not fully conversant with the criminal law implications, judging from the discussion
that followed his lecture, Should the Laws of War be Modernized?, given at the Faculty of Law in
Stockholm (October 10,1972).
10. When drafting the new Swedish Constitution of 1974, the Norwegian wartime experience
was the only one relied upon. See Statens offentliga utredningar 1972:18 (Norway and the Nor-
wegian Government-in-Exile During the Second World War).
Page 67: Spring 1978]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
try overseas; a resistance movement is created; resistance is offered in every
situation; and finally victory comes when the government returns with its vic-
torious allies. The famous pamphlet, Om kriget kommer (If War Comes), relied
on this model. First published in 1943, Om kriget kommer was heavily influ-
enced by the misfortunes of the Norwegians and the roots of their troubles.
The pamphlet gave vent to the tough approach of the wartime years, which
continued throughout the nervous 1950s. "Resistance shall be made always
and in every situation," it declared. "We will never give up. Every announce-
ment that resistance is to be abandoned is false.""1
Today, however, one might doubt whether the Norwegian model is realis-
tic. Certain conditions had to be satisfied before the Norwegian resistance
movement was even accepted as a national movement. In 1956 the holders of
the three Swedish chairs of international law published a report called The
Norwegian Purge,'1 2 which looked into the historical development of the move-
ment more closely. The professors strongly emphasized the importance of the
rapidly increasing antagonism between Germany and Russia in 1941, which ul-
timately resulted in the outbreak of war in June of the same year. The Ger-
man attack on the Soviet Union, drawing the Communists into the fight
against Germany, created the necessary prerequisites for Norwegian unity. 13
There is no reason to expect a similar development of unity if Sweden be-
came involved in a war: no matter how Sweden might be drawn into a war,
we can expect pro-West or pro-East guerrilla activity. The Norwegian model
is deceptive from the outset.
This becomes even more clear if one considers the development in Sweden
described by foreign observers as "finlandization," which has been brewing in
Sweden since the mid-sixties. This observation of "neutralization and expo-
sure to Soviet threats"' 4 refers basically to the combination of Sweden's bor-
11. The pamphlet was first published, pursuant to Royal order, by Statens informations-
styrelse in 1943. A second edition, by Civilf6rsvarsstyrelsen, appeared in 1952; the third and last
edition was put out by the Department of the Interior in 1961.
12. H. EEK, E. FAHLBECK & H. SUNDBERG, DEN NORSKA RATrSUPPGORELSEN-RESPONSUM OCH
UTREDNING (Institutet f6r offentlig och internationell ratt nr. 18).
13. "When the period of resistance may be said to have come into being is hard to say but in
the Report, on the basis of Norwegian sources, the change in attitude is believed to coincide with
the entry into war of the Soviet Union, the Norwegian communists turning from Germanophiles
to Germanophobes, turning to sabotage and violent attacks as means of combat, and the shift in
the fortunes of war, the Germans starting to suffer military setbacks that gave hope to the Nor-
wegians. It would seem that not until 1943 did the Home Front and the London Government ac-
cept violence as a means of struggle; the arrest of the Norwegian officers followed the same year,
removing them as prisoners of war to camps in Germany and simultaneously Sweden announced
the termination of the transit traffic." H. Sundberg, Den norska rittsuppgrelsen och svenska
medborgare, 1958 FORVALTNINGSRATTSLIG T1DSKRIFT 192. Compare R. PETROW, THE BITTER
YEARS: THE INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF DENMARK AND NORWAY, APRIL 1940-MAY 1945 (1974).
14. Sulzberger, To the Finland Station?, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1972, § 4, at 15, col. 1. David Vi-
tal refers to "the now traditional and well-understood forms of loose and indirect control over
Finnish affairs;" and, in contrast, the tendency "to manipulate--or manoeuvre within-a balance
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der state location and its increasing alienation of the power that can coun-
terbalance the hegemonial power. The insidious effects of finlandization on
Sweden's fighting spirit make a repetition of the Norwegian type of national
consensus highly unlikely.
E. The Law of Belligerent Occupation
A few centuries after the end of the religious wars, European wars came
to be waged between soldiers representing states that employed them, rather
than between peoples. A parallel development in military thinking established
the occupation of enemy territory as the ultimate end of army operations. In
the wake of these developments, efforts devoted to formulating the laws of
war during the time of the Concert of Europe focused largely on belligerent
occupation. This work resulted in the Hague Rules of Land Warfare.15
After the end of the Second World War, an attempt was made to develop
further the principles of the Hague Rules. The 1949 Red Cross Conventions
resulted from these endeavors. The Fourth Convention, the Geneva Con-
vention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of Au-
gust 12, 1949, contains a number of rules for the relationship between the oc-
cupying power and the inhabitants of the occupied territory. The Third
Convention, the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War of August 12, 1949, is also often applicable in situations arising under
occupation.
Like its Scandinavian neighbors Denmark and Norway, Sweden has
ratified the Hague Convention of 1907 with the Rules of Land Warfare.
When the Red Cross Conventions were signed, a meeting of Ministers in Oslo
in March, 1951, decided that experts should discuss'problems of interpreta-
tion before ratification was undertaken. A Committee was set up for that
purpose: "de skandinaviske utvalg av sakkyndige til fortolkning av visse
bestemmelser i Genevekonvensjonene." 16 Among the Committee's members
were Professor Castberg and Mr. Justice Kruse-Jensen from Norway, Profes-
of restraint and pressure between it and the preponderant power in whose sphere it falls." D. VI-
TAL, THE SURVIVAL OF SMALL STATES 115, 117 (1971).
15. Hague Convention No. IV respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, October
18, 1907, Regulations Annexed, [1910] 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 2 MALLOY, TREATIES 2269,
containing a master pattern for the instructions to be issued to the armies of the warring parties
to the Convention [hereinafter referred to as the Hague Rules; all references to this source are to
THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 and 1907 (J. Scott ed. 1915)]. A number of
articles of this Annex refer to the relationship between the occupying power and the inhabitants
of the occupied territory.
16. The story of the committee is reported in Rapport fra de skandinaviske utvalg av
sakkyndige til fortolkning av visse bestemmelser i Genive-konvensjonene. Manuscript No. 151-1.
The title page of this publication explains, "This is not to be considered as a rule book [reglement]
and does not contain provisions of a rule character [reglementeriske bestemmelser]. It is printed by
the Supreme Army Command rather than being mimeographed and will be distributed in the
Army for information purposes." (Author's translation.)
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sor GihI of Sweden, and Minister Georg Cohn of Denmark. On October 1,
1952, the committee's report was ready. The Norwegian Supreme Army
Command (Haerens Over Kommando) published the report later in 1952. By
that time, Denmark and Norway had already deposited their instruments of
ratification of the two Conventions-Denmark, on June 27, 1951, and
Norway, on August 3, 1951. Only Sweden awaited the publication of the re-
port before ratifying on December 4, 1952. The rules of the Geneva Protocols
are superimposed on this body of law.
We have yet to characterize the law developed in the 1949 Red Cross Con-
ventions and the Hague Conventions of 1907. This body of law, ultimately
derived from late nineteenth-century military thought, displays a markedly
bourgeois view of war and law. From its perspective, war is decidedly a con-
frontation between states and their armed forces; war is a duel between states,
a contest that may, like the duel, still be tied to certain forms in pursuance of
certain goals-whatever the bloodshed. By and large, all governments are
fundamentally the same and differ only in details; war, even if it cannot be
avoided altogether, is in essence a regrettable interruption of the normal or-
der within an otherwise harmonious civilization. Since war is a contest be-
tween states, it shall also, so far as possible, be limited to the states; as a result,
private property is inviolable. Just as no individual state is entitled to violate
the private property of its inhabitants, neither can an enemy state violate the
private property of inhabitants in territory it occupies as part of its war
against the inhabitants' former state. Finally, the idea that judicial review is
the safeguard against abuse prevails in this body of law; the court is there to
protect the individual against the state, and consequently it is up to the courts
to see that the state does not overstep its competence.
F. The Law in Action: Bourgeois States and Socialist States
Belligerent occupation has occurred from time to time in the course of the
many wars, big and small, that have taken place during this century. The con-
ditions of the 1940s, when the German Reich came overseas and occupied
Norway, are, of course, those closest to Swedish experience. In this case, a
power of socialistic philosophy (albeit "National" Socialism) occupied a power
of bourgeois philosophy. This creates some tension for analysis from the per-
spective of the law of war: the ideology of the occupying power was in many
ways in conflict with the philosophy of the Hague Rules insofar as they re-
lated to belligerent occupation, in particular, with regard to the inviolability of
private property and the necessity of judicial review. The predominant view
in Germany at that time went against setting up any laws for the administra-
tion. Such antipathy is not exceptional: Mr. Justice Wennergren characterizes
modern Swedish administration as follows: "In many fields the activity of the
authorities . . . is dominated by informal relationships or negotiations and
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contracts.'17 But the Germans went much further. Courts had absolutely no
jurisdiction in public administration: "Es durfen uber Fuihrungsfragen nicht
Nicht-Fiihrer entscheiden [only those who are leaders are to decide leadership
questions].""' Expanding the political administration and releasing it from le-
gal form was the precondition for putting people into concentration camps
for indeterminate periods and making "the people's sense of justice, such as
we find it in genuine popular feeling" (Volksempfinden) the basis for sentencing
people.1 9 On the other hand, within the occupied state, with Norway's emo-
tional fixation on the Eidsvoll Constitution and constitutionalism in general,
the view of law generally taken at that time was very much in harmony with
the leading ideas of the Hague Rules.
It is well known that the debellatio the German Reich suffered in 1945 is
supposed to have prevented the applicability of the law of belligerent occupa-
tion in its case. But debellatio also has a place in Marxist legal thinking.
Marxist thinking is deterministic. The developing process leads inexorably up-
wards: it cannot go downwards or turn in circles. Consequently, it leads inevi-
tably from capitalism to socialism; it cannot lead from socialism to capitalism.
If such a perversion threatens to take place, all good forces are called upon to
prevent it and set the development back on the right course, as the world has
been reminded from time to time-the last occasion being when the so-called
Brezhnev Doctrine explained why the Czech Spring of 1968 could not con-
tinue. Essentially, we are faced with a belief in the predetermined advance of
civilization and in an overriding legal duty to prepare and assist in this
process-when necessary, by resort to armed force.
It is fully consonant with this thinking that when the Soviets occupied Pol-
ish territory pursuant to the Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, the People's Com-
missariat for Foreign Affairs, in an official note of September 17, 1939, should
proclaim, as a basic "theoretical conception," the "nonexistence" of the Polish
bourgeois state.20 In keeping with this class struggle "debellatio," the Polish
17. WENNERGREN, SVENSK JURISTTIDNING 558 (1951).
18. TATARIN-TAMHEYDEN, 1934 ARCHly DES 6FFENTLICHEN RECHTS 356 (editor's translation).
19. This is the infamous general clause in Section 2 of the 1871 German Penal Code
(Reichsstrafgesetzbuch), as amended on June 28, 1935. Cf. Hamburger, L'analogie dans le droit pe-
nal allemand, 1937 REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT PENAL COMPARE 182-194.
20. It should be noted that the German prisoners of war in the Soviet Union were sentenced
in a similar way---see generally R. MAURACH, DIE KRIEGSVERBRECHERPROZESSE GEGEN DEUTSCHE
GEFANGENE IN DER SOWJETUNION 14 (1950)-although the expectations of its allies forced the So-
viet Union to a certain amount of adaptation to the classical international law rather than
pursuing its socialist theory of war: "Der Krieg ist fir die Sowjetideologie eine zwangsliufige
Begleiterscheinung der kapitalistich-imperialistischen Ordnung, sei es, dass Staaten dieser Struktur
miteinander in Konflikt geraten, sei es, das die bewaffnete Auseinandersetzung ihr wahres
Gesicht offenbart, nimlich den offenen Kampf zwischen den rivalisierenden Klassen, den
globalen Burgerkrieg, der seinem Wesen nach nie mit einem Kompromiss, sondern nur mit den
Sturz und der Totalvernichtung [ergo, debellatio] eines der ringenden Systeme enden kann."
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armed forces enjoyed no protection under the Hague Rules or the 1925 Ge-
neva Convention and were simply "members of armed bands" resisting legal
authority and were to be treated according to the criminal law. This paved the
way to the woods of Katyn.
2t
There seems to be no reason to suppose that such thinking will not be pro-
longed into the future. Even among the victorious Western powers of the Sec-
ond World War, the will to respect the Hague Rules failed when debellatio was
the ultimate goal. "The truth is," wrote the British professor of international
law, H. A. Smith, "that from the first it was part of [the Western powers']
avowed military purpose to destroy utterly the two totalitarian systems. They
had announced in advance their intention of doing precisely what the Hague
Rules had purported to forbid, except that they 'respected' and continued in
force the normal civil and penal codes."2 2 A similar destructive intention must,
of course, be present when a socialist power overcomes a social order that it
conceives as being bourgeois-in socialist thinking, this state is doomed to die
anyway, and it is totally evil and offensive to public morals because it is imperi-
alistic and war provoking. The difference between the imperialism of the West-
ern powers and Nazi imperialism is minimal in this respect, compared to the
difference between the principles followed in the socialist camp and those
embodied in the capitalist social order.
How the regulation of belligerent occupation will function when a socialist
state occupies another socialist state, and whether the resultant views of the
states will fail to remain in harmony with the perspective of the Hague Rules, is
still pure speculation. But when Sweden discusses belligerent occupation, this
issue is the heart of the matter.
Social development in Sweden has long advanced into a purer kind of so-
cialist system-a development moving at an accelerated pace since the mid-
sixties-partly by means of the tax system, which has brought about what is
hereinafter referred to as the "high tax society," and partly because of a new
view of courts and the judicial function. The Swedish tax system, which has
long been steeply progressive, has been employed for a number of other pur-
poses besides providing revenue for the state. Its use as an instrument of eco-
nomic policy is now commonplace. Tax rebates are devised to provide incen-
tives for a certain type of enterprise, or a certain region, or a certain group of
people. The levelling effects on the economic conditions of the citizens are seen
as one of the central tasks of the tax system. The tax system is a new, enor-
mous, and all-pervading power apparatus.
The Swedish courts have become increasingly politicized. This began when
the lay assessors became politically elected officials after the Second World
21. 1 have relied here on the collection of documents published by Fitzgibbon. L. FITZGIBBON,
THE KATYN MASSAcRE 34 (1977).
22. Smith, Book Review, 7 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 789, 792 (1958).
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War. Thereupon the lay assessors were given increased influence upon
court judgments. Eventually the lay assessors' service on the bench was re-
garded as a special political responsibility. This role was explained in Parlia-
ment when the so-called lex Timr& was passed: "To us, Social Democrats, it can
never be a question of the responsibility for the political ideology . . . disap-
pearing if we are elected lay assessors.12 3 Similarly, the attitude towards judicial
office was much less unequivocal and high-principled in the new Constitution
of 1974 than it had been previously. "The new Constitution completely dis-
cards the separation-of-powers system that characterized, originally, the 1809
Constitution"; "the fact that the separation-of-powers principle thereby disap-
pears is an important advance in my view and an essential part of the reform,"
explained the Swedish Minister of Justice. 24 One may also trace the develop-
ment of a new attitude among Swedish judges. In a doctoral dissertation pub-
lished in 1973, Frindberg asserted, "In Sweden, there is no doubt that the judi-
cial organs consider themselves subordinate to the highest political organs
(Parliament and Cabinet) . . . although these [judicial organs] under the [1809]
Constitution are equal to the former [political] organs and furthermore nowa-
days have a law-making function that has clearly been spelled out. '2 5
The Swedish society in which an application of the rules of belligerent occu-
pation should be envisaged is consequently not of the same kind as the Nor-
wegian society upon which the German occupation was imposed; it is even
less similar to the bourgeois society under the rule of law that was in the
minds of the drafters of the Hague Rules.
II
THE CASE STUDY
A. The Administration of Occupied Territory
The 1949 Red Cross Conventions set up a rather detailed model for the
administration of occupied territory. If we apply this pattern to a hypothetical
Swedish situation, the following picture emerges.
From article 64 of the Fourth Convention, 26 it follows that within Sweden
as an occupied territory the domestic Swedish legal order and court organiza-
tion would be left to operate as before, though with some exceptions.
The Swedish legal order would be supplemented by a new system of pro-
23. Snabbprotokoll frAn riksdagsdebatterna 1975/1976 nr. 45, at 13 passim. The Act that is
called lex Timrd reacted against the socialist parties in TimrA that had made a point of
making only socialists lay assessors.
24. Kungl. proposition 1973:90, at 91, 155. Cf. Statens Offentliga Utredningar 1974:15, at 76.
25. FRANDBERG, OM ANALOG AVANDNING AV RATTSNORMER 159 (1973).
26. GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR
OF AUGUST 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter referred to
as the Fourth Conventionl.
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visions aimed at maintaining orderly government and ensuring the security of
the occupying forces. These provisions are to be enforced through powers be-
stowed upon the occupying power by article 64, paragraph 2,27 and are to be
issued by the enemy commander in the area. This commander would be sub-
ject to the requirements set out in article 65 to the effect that the penal provi-
sions shall not come into force before they have been published and brought
to the knowledge of the inhabitants in Swedish; their effect may not be retro-
active. Thus, the commander would hold the powers of government: all
administrative and legislative powers would be in his hands. Violations of his
ordinances and criminal acts against the security of the occupying power
would be tried in his military courts, pursuant to article 66. These courts must
be properly constituted, they must sit in the occupied territory, and they may
not be political. Apparently, the Civilian Convention assumes, without stating
so explicitly, that the courts of the expelled power would be nonpolitical-an
assumption that would not hold true in a socialist country.
According to article 54, the occupying power may not change the status of
public officials or judges yet is always empowered to remove them from their
posts. The powers of the enemy commander include employing public offi-
cials such as judges and policemen.
It seems likely, then, that the local Swedish courts would carry on as be-
fore and would be recruited from the local Swedish population. The political
elections of lay assessors, however, would create a problem. One could hardly
expect that the occupying power would not influence such elections in favor
of its sympathizers-for example, by prohibiting other political activity. The
end result may well be that the local courts will be political, while the military
courts will not.
In the Hague Rules it is assumed that the local police force will consist of
the same personnel that served before the occupation. By the Swedish Act of
1943, relating to the status of the police in time of war, it was decided that
the police should have the same status under international law as that applied
pursuant to the Hague Rules to the armed military units participating in the
hostilities. Provisions implementing this decision were enacted in 1958. The
1977 Geneva Protocols provide on this point, that a party who thus "incor-
porates a paramilitary of armed law enforcement agency into its armed forces
• ..shall so notify the other parties to the conflict.12I To the extent that this
means that the local police will be made prisoners of war, apparently, the en-
emy commander will appoint his own policemen-or militia, as he may prefer
to call them.
27. Id. at para. 2.
28. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF
12 AUGUST 1949, Protocol I, art. 43, para. 3 (1977).
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B. Focus on the Motor Repair Service (MRT)
To better understand the working of the system of law created for bellig-
erent occupation by the treaty apparatus a case study is useful. Faced with
a country of socialist philosophy like Sweden organized for war in a spirit of
total defense, it seems appropriate to select one of the total defense organiza-
tions as the focus of study. We will therefore limit our further investigation to
one important area of total defense, motor repairs-specifically, to the Motor
Repair Service (MRT). This apparatus would require most repair shops in the
country to serve the armed forces in a total defense effort. The shops would
be staffed by a work force of civilians over age, normally those who were
working there in time of peace. However, the executive level would be staffed
by conscript officers or volunteers holding military rank from ensign to colo-
nel.
C. The Rights of the Occupying Power
The system laid down in the Hague Rules, supplemented by the 1949 Red
Cross Conventions and, on limited points, by the 1977 Geneva Protocols, gives
the occupying power, besides its possibilities of ordering prisoners of war to
work, three additional means of securing goods and services from the
occupied country: making requisition, exacting contribution, and seizure.
Ordering prisoners of war to work is regulated by article 49 of the Third
Geneva Convention. 29 Requisition is regulated by article 52 in the Hague
Rules and is characterized, above all, by the obligation to pay full compensa-
tion when private ownership is violated. Contribution, regulated in articles 48
and 49 of the Hague Rules, is characterized by the occupying power levying a
tax "in accordance with the rules of assessment and incidence in force" at the
time,30 that is to say, without compensation. Seizure is regulated in article 53
of the Hague Rules and is characterized by the occupying power's taking pos-
session of the property in order to deprive the adverse party from benefiting
therefrom; there is no compensation until after the end of the war.
D. The Law in Action
It may be expected that the occupying power would seize most materials
operated by the MRT as being "all kinds of munitions of war" or "appliances ...
adapted for the transmission of news, or for the transport of persons or things. 3 No
compensation would be given, though the question of compensation would be
29. GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR OF AUGUST 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter referred to as the Third
Convention].
30. Hague Rules, supra note 15, at art. 48.
31. Id. at art. 53 (italics indicate difference from Convention of 1899).
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discussed after the end of the war. The military personnel of the MRT would
be treated as prisoners of war and would thus be liable to be used as labor
within the framework of article 49 of the Prisoner of War Convention. Inso-
far as civilian personnel are concerned, the occupying power may requisition
their services pursuant to article 52 of the Hague Rules. These services would
be remunerated, presumably along the same lines as their work for the Swed-
ish total defense.
Consequently, prima facie, the treaty regulation means that the complete
MRT apparatus would be at the service of the occupying power. This does
not mean, however, that the organization would be unconditionally at the dis-
posal of the occupying power. There are also a number of restraints that may
be invoked against the occupying power.
E. The Officer Privilege
Article 49 of the Prisoner of War Convention reads as follows:
The Detaining Power may utilize the labour of prisoners of war who are
physically fit, taking into account their age, sex, rank and physical aptitude,
and with a view particularly to maintaining them in a good state of physical
and mental health.
Non-commissioned officers who are prisoners of war shall only be re-
quired to do supervisory work. Those not so required may ask for other suit-
able work which shall, so far as possible, be found for them.
If officers or persons of equivalent status ask for suitable work, it shall be
found for them, so far as possible, but they may in no circumstance be
compelled to work.3 2
Thus, it follows that "officers" are not under obligation to work. In the 1972
Swedish manual on how one is to act when taken prisoner of war, article 49 is
rephrased as meaning that "officers and persons of equivalent status may only
be given work that has been voluntarily consented to, and non-commissioned
officers [plutonsofficerare] may only be used for supervisory work. '33 The Arti-
cles of War in the Swedish Penal Code try to build character by adding that
anyone who "procures for the enemy military manpower, equipment, provi-
sions or support" may subsequently be sentenced for treason if the act "in-
volves considerable aid to the enemy. '34
However, in practice, the officer privilege has been easy to circumvent.
During the Second World War, as part of intelligence operations in Britain,
the German Unteroffiziere taken prisoners of war were simply deprived of
their identity cards. Since these were never returned to their owners, the offi-
32. Third Convention, supra note 29, at art. 49.
33. Krigsfnge-Anvisningarr f6r upptraidande i krigsf~ngenskap. 1972 Ars upplaga, faststAlld
av GB, at 67.
34. THE PENAL CODE OF SWEDEN (T. Sellin trans. 1965), at ch. 22, § 1 [hereinafter cited as
1962 Swedish Penal Code].
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cers were unable to prove their status. In this way, 26,000 German noncom-
missioned officers were forced to perform prisoner of war service in the
United States."5 The Scandinavian Report voices some skepticism in relation
to issuing identity cards to the merchant fleet personnel and adds that the
possession of the card is only a formality; 36 but that hardly takes proper ac-
count of the practical situation, it would seem, considering the German expe-
rience.
F. Military Operations Against One's Own Country
Neither prisoners of war nor civilian personnel whose services are subject
to requisition can be called upon to take part in military operations against
their own country. However, it is necessary to distinguish between requisi-
tioned services and prisoner of war work.
In article 52 of the Hague Rules it is said that the requisitioned services
"shall be ...of such a nature as not to involve the inhabitants in the obliga-
tion of taking part in military operations against their own country." This
connects with article 23, paragraph h, which forbids an occupying power to
"compel the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed
against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent's service before the com-
mencement of the war."137 Article 51 of the Civilian Convention adds to this:
Protected persons may not be compelled to undertake any work which would
involve them in the obligation of taking part in military operations. The Oc-
cupying Power may not compel protected persons to employ forcible means
to ensure the security of the installations where they are performing compul-
sory labour....
In no case shall requisition of labour lead to the mobilization of workers in
an organization of a military or semi-military character 
a
3
The meaning of this restraint (stop rule) is not fully clear. The Norwegian
coastal trade's shipping of arms and ammunitions for the German Wehrmacht
during the German occupation raised this issue. The Norwegian side argued
that the Germans "were not entitled to force the inhabitants of the occupied
country to render transportation services in the line of fire" and questioned
whether service on a Norwegian coaster "should not be considered as trans-
port service in the line of fire under conditions of land warfare." Certainly,
transportation services outside the Norwegian territorial sea could not be req-
uisitioned. 3
9
35. 1 INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED
CROSS ON ITS ACTIVITIES DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR 339 (1948).
36. Rapport fra de skandinaviske utvalg, 1952, anT 10-Utferdigelse av identitetskort i
henhold til krigsfangekonvensjonens art. 17, tredje ledd.
37. Hague Rules, supra note 15, at art. 52 & art. 23, para. h (italics indicate difference from
Convention of 1899).
38. Fourth Convention, supra note 26, at art. 51.
39. F. CASTBERG, NORGE UNDER OKKUPASIONEN-RETTSLIGE UTREDNINGER 1940-1943, at 196
(1945).
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The introduction of the notions of "an organization of a military or semi-
military character" is not very helpful when confronted with the total-defense
concept of society. Pictet's commentary leaves the matter with the following
remark: "The application of this clause depends very largely on the good
faith of the occupant, who must judge in each individual case, with a full
sense of his responsibility in the matter whether or not the work demanded is
compatible with the conditions here laid down."'40 The Scandinavian Report is
perhaps more helpful. It says:
There was, however, a consensus that the occupying power cannot request the
persons belonging to the civilian population of the occupied country to per-
form work that, since it is performed in the vicinity of the theatre of opera-
tions or due to other reasons, will expose those who are to perform the work
to extraordinary danger [saerlig fare].41
As far as prisoners of war are concerned, the stop rule has received a very
special formulation. Article 50 of the Prisoner of War Convention enumerates
those categories of work that prisoners of war may be ordered to perform:
Besides work connected with camp administration, installation or mainte-
nance, prisoners of war may be compelled to do only such work as is included
in the following classes:
(c) transport and handling of stores which are not military in character or
purpose .42
In paragraph b of the same article, the industries in which a prisoner of war
may be compelled to work are enumerated as follows: "industries connected
with the production or the extraction of raw materials, and manufacturing in-
dustries, with the exception of metallurgical, machinery and chemical indus-
tries; public works and building operations which have no military character
or purpQse. '43
Thus, only work performed in certain industries is forbidden. Prisoners of
war may be compelled to work in other industries regardless of what they
produce. As Colonel Levie has observed:
Apparently a prisoner of war may now be compelled to work in a factory
manufacturing military uniforms or gas masks or camouflage netting, as these
items are neither made by the three prohibited manufacturing industries nor
is their military character or purpose material; but once manufactured, a pris-
oner of war may not be compelled to load them on a truck or freight car, as
they probably have a military character and they certainly have a military pur-
pose.4
4
40. 0. UHLER, H. COURSIER, F. SIORDET, C. PILLOUD, R. BOPPE, R. WILHELM, & J.
SCHOENHOLZER, COMMENTARY ON IV GENEVA CONVENTION (). Pictet ed. 1958).
41. Rapport fra de skandinaviske utvalg, 1952, anm 8-Anvendelsen av tvangsmidler ifolge
sivilkonvensjonens artikkel 51, anet ledd.
42. Third Convention, supra note 29, at art. 50.
43. Id. at para. b.
44. Levie, The Employment of Prisoners of War, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 337 (1967).
[Vol. 42: No. 2
BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION
Apparently, these rules would limit the usefulness of the prisoner of war
personnel of the MRT organization to the occupying party. These personnel
would be able to refuse any transport and handling of stores that were military
in character, as well as any MRT work that could be said to be of metallurgi-
cal or mechanical engineering character. The civilian personnel would have
less occasion to be uncooperative: apart from cases of extraordinary danger,
they could refuse only guard duty and the like.
G. The Needs of the Army of Occupation, the Public
Utility Services, and the Civil Defense
According to article 52 of the Hague Rules, supplemented by the second
paragraph of article 51 of the Civilian Convention, requisition is only permis-
sible when it relates to "work which is necessary either for the needs of the
army of occupation, or for the public utility services, or . . .transportation ...
of the population of the occupied country.145
During the German occupation of Norway, the application of this stop
rule was contested when it was learned that the Germans intended to requisi-
tion the tramway equipment of the city of Oslo to replace tramway equipment
in German cities that had been destroyed by Allied bombing.46
The Geneva Protocol of 1977 has introduced a new stop rule in the field,
which confers a kind of immunity against requisition, or diversion from
proper use, upon "matiriel belonging to or used by civil defence organiza-
tions," meaning equipment, supplies, and transports used by these organiza-
tions for the performance of, inter alia, evacuation, fire fighting, and emer-
gency repair of indispensable public utilities.4 7 However, this immunity is not
absolute: an exception is introduced in article 63, paragraph 5:
Provided that the general rule in paragraph 4 continues to be observed
[meaning that there be no diversion or requisition harmful to the civilian pop-
ulation] the Occupying Power may requisition or divert these resources, sub-
ject to the following particular conditions:
(a) that the buildings or matiriel are necessary for other needs of the civilian
population; and
(b) that the requisition or diversion continues only while such necessity ex-
ists.48
H. Judicial Review
International law relating to the rights of the occupying power vis-&-vis the
inhabitants of, and the property in, the occupied territory is th.us largely
treaty law and lends itself well to enforcement by courts. In a way, the treaty
45. Fourth Convention, supra note 26, at art. 51; see Hague Rules, supra note 15, at art. 52.
46. F. CASTBERG, supra note 39, at 205.
47. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 28, at Protocol I, art. 63, para. 4.
48. Id. at para. 5.
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law corresponds to a constitution in these extraordinary conditions. The occu-
pying power is, of course, always tempted to use its legislative powers to ob-
tain in a circuitous way what the rules of international law prevent it from
getting directly. For example, war-risk legislation compelling insurance
companies to assume the final responsibility for damages the occupying power
would otherwise have to pay under the rules of requisition might be en-
acted.4 9 The need for judicial review is thus easy to see.
This discussion provides a background for the recurrent tendency of do-
mestic courts to interfere with and sometimes set aside ordinances from the
enemy commander that lie outside his competence under international law. A
classic case is the Norwegian Supreme Court, which insisted upon the primacy
of its powers over those of the German occupation authorities: finally, rather
than accept the limited role the Germans were prepared to let the Court play,
all its members resigned their offices on December 21, 1940.
But judicial review is unpopular with socialists. When the new Swedish
Constitution was being drafted, great efforts were made to get rid of this in-
stitution. These efforts may not have been fully successful, but it is clear that
lay assessors recruited from among sympathizers with the occupying power,
who might uphold a socialist philosophy in fulfilling their judicial role, 50 are
not likely to be much of a protection against an overstepping of competence
by the occupying power.
I. "Voluntary" Service
The stop rules found in the treaty law refer only to compulsory requisition
and to compelling prisoners of war to work. To the extent that the services
are offered on a voluntary basis, it is quite clear that the occupying power is
fully entitled to use them. Unfortunately, the distinction between what is com-
pulsory and what is voluntary is not always clear. An occupying power will
naturally feel free to exploit the means of pressure at its disposal to get volun-
tary offers of goods and services. Any power occupying Swedish territory will
find that these means of pressure are considerable: the Swedish high tax soci-
ety is a wonderful power apparatus to inherit.
Under article 48 of the Hague Rules, the army of occupation has the right
to collect "the taxes, dues, and tolls imposed for the benefit of the State.
5 1
Furthermore, the occupying party may, pursuant to article 49, levy "other
money contributions in the occupied territory ...for the needs of the army
or of the administration of the territory in question.152 According to article
51, when levying such contributions, the occupying power shall do so "in ac-
49. Cf. F. CASTBERG, supra note 39, at 192.
50. See pp. [10-11] supra.
51. Hague Rules, supra note 15, at art. 48.
52. Id. at art. 49.
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cordance with the rules of assessment and incidence of the taxes in force" at
the time.5 3 This places the entire Swedish tax system in the hands of the occu-
pying power.
It may be added that in socialist countries the taxation instrument has al-
ways been used systematically to persecute and destroy obnoxious elements of
society that have been suspected of forming a hard core of resistance on be-
half of the bourgeois class-for instance, farmers, artisans, and shopkeepers:
"Die Besteuerung der Kapitalisten ist keine Gerechtigkeitsfrage sondern eine
Zweckmi/3igkeitsfrage [the taxation of capitalists is not a question of justice
but one of expediency]."
Civic courage has a very limited place in the society that resulted from the
Swedish development. Mr. Justice Gustaf Petr6n has dealt with this matter on
the basis of his experience in the Office of the Ombudsman for the Judiciary
and Civil Administration 
4
A major part of the body of law that concerns all of us is so made that I
may receive a special reward or avoid an inconvenience if particular reasons
are present. Who decides whether I have special reasons? Evidently, the
decision-makers at all levels. In this way multitudes among the people become
dependent upon the authorities--officials, high and low-taking a benevolent
view of them.
Petr6n offers a list of illustrations of such decisions, in which taxation deci-
sions rank high. He concludes, "He who knows that he needs the authorities
to be kindly disposed towards him, will be careful to avoid doing anything
that may upset these highly placed persons.
55
This form of pressure-at times innocent, at times not-has become a
characteristic of the high tax society. Under belligerent occupation, when
many sympathizers with the occupying power are likely to be appointed or
elected to posts in the administration for the purpose of aiding the occupying
party, it would be unrealistic-to believe that the instrument of taxation would
not be used as a weapon to call forth "voluntary" offers of goods and services.
This would be a weapon at least equal in importance to the more straightfor-
ward powers set out in the Hague Rules and the Red Cross Conventions as
belonging to the occupying power.
J. The War of Laws
The following provision appears in the Articles of War in the Swedish Pe-
nal Code:
A person, who, when the country is at war ...
4. procures for the enemy military manpower, provisions or support, or
53. Id. at art. 51.
54. Petr~n, Maktens verkningar, G6teborgs Handels-och Sj6fartstidning, May 24, 1973, at 3.
55. Id.
Page 67: Spring 1978]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
5. commits any other similar treasonable act, shall, if the act is likely to re-
sult in considerable harm to the military forces of the Realm or otherwise to
the defence of the Realm or to the provisioning of the public or involves con-
siderable aid to the enemy, be sentenced....
If the act referred to in the first paragraph is only to a lesser degree likely
to result in harm to the defence of the Realm or the provisioning of the pub-
lic, or involves a lesser aid to the enemy, than there stated, imprisonment for
at most six years shall be imposed for treachery. If the act consisted of fur-
nishing of equipment or provisions or of some other service to the enemy
within an area occupied by him and if, considering the needs of the population,
the offender's livelihood or other special circumstances, the act could not be
regarded as inappropriate, no punishment shall be imposed.56
By this type of legislation, the smaller states in particular have attempted
to limit the value of the rights conferred upon an occupying power by the
Hague Rules and the Geneva Conventions. At one time the issue may have
been seen as how to achieve a distribution of competence between the occu-
pying power and the expelled power. The German army so favored this view
that during the First World War the German army of occupation undertook
to publish the legislation of the government-in-exile that applied to the
occupied territory. Later the dominant view came to regard the Hague Rules
as only limiting what the occupying power could lawfully request from the
population-not limiting what the expelled power could request from the
same population. During the Second World War in particular, the Norwe-
gians went far in pressing this new view; they even punished Norwegian
nurses for having treated German soldiers. On this point there is a clear re-
treat from such an interpretation of competence and responsibility in the
Scandinavian Report. The report proclaims a consensus to the effect that "ci-
vilian hospitals, even if they are not requisitioned, are under a duty to receive
and treat wounded or sick individuals or smaller groups belonging to the
armed forces of the occupying power. '5 7 Furthermore, the Scandinavian ex-
perts are unanimously of the opinion that the right of the occupying power to
punish a refusal to obey an order to work will not disappear just because the
government-in-exile has forbidden its citizens to obey such an order, subject
to the proviso that the order was made in accordance with international law. 58
The Swedish legislation on this matter is copied from the Norwegian. Con-
sequently, the Norwegian experience may also be of some interest when inter-
preting the term "inappropriate" in chapter 22, section 1.11 The equivalent
Norwegian term was interpreted very differently as the Second World War
56. 1962 Swedish Penal Code, supra note 34, at ch. 22, § I (emphasis added).
57. Rapport fra de skandinaviske utvalg, 1952 anm. 19--Okkupasjonsmaktens rett til A
rekvirere leger.
58. Rapport fra de skandinaviske utvalg, 1952, anm. 8-Anvendelsen tvangsmidler ifcflge
sivilkonvensjonens artikkel 51, annet ledd.
59. 1962 Swedish Penal Code, supra note 34, at ch. 22, § 1.
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proceeded. During the early period, under the impact of the Norwegian de-
feat manifested in the 1940 armistice, nothing seemed to be inappropriate.
Parliament could even be lawfully convened for the purpose of dethroning
the King. During a middle period, that was no longer possible: those who
agreed to serve as judges in the Supreme Court when the offices became va-
cant as a result of the resignations of December 21, 1940, were subsequently
punished for treachery.60 During a third period, which commenced when the
Communists denounced their previous cooperation with the Nazis as a result
of the outbreak of the German-Russian war and turned to guerrilla activity
and the like, almost any contact with the enemy became inappropriate and
constituted treachery. The private citizen had to have a highly developed sen-
sitivity to understand in time what was "inappropriate" and what was not.
CONCLUSION
When one analyzes in this way what the law of belligerent occupation
means in every detail, taking account of even the most modern developments,
the picture is discouraging from a Swedish point of view. The overwhelming
impression is that the rules today are, to say the least, inadequate for modern
state conditions-in particular, those dominated by the socialist conceptions of
state and law. From a Swedish point of view it would have been highly desir-
able for the recent work to improve the laws of war to have elucidated some
of the new problems. Regrettably, that was not done. Our hope will remain,
as it always has, that there will be no war, since that would make these efforts
superfluous anyway.
60. 1946 Norsk Rettstidende 1139.
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